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From the
Editor-in-Chief

W

hen I took over as editor-inchief from Terry Copp in 2006,
we quickly agreed that we would
like to see fuller coverage of the Cold
War in the journal. That was not the
only reason why I was particularly
pleased to receive the articles
presented in this issue on two leading
Canadian ﬁgures, Omond Solandt,
the founding head of the Defence
Research Board, and General Charles
Foulkes, chairman of the chiefs of
staff committee. Both articles present
new archival research on important
but little known stories, and both
authors are young scholars; Jason
Ridler recently completed his Ph.D. at
the Royal Military College of Canada,
and Michael Manulak is a student
at Carleton University’s Norman
Paterson School of International
Affairs.
Solandt, although a Canadian,
played a leading part in the
development of operational research
in the British Army during the
Second World War, as Jason relates
in his article. By pure coincidence,
Terry provided us with a preliminary

report produced under Solandt’s
supervision that endeavours to
quantify salient features of attack and
defence on each of the ﬁve beaches in
Normandy assaulted by Allied forces
on D-Day.
I continue to be impressed – and
moved – by new work that brings
to life the human dimension of the
First World War. Distant as the
First World War may seem, work
at this level of detail in personal
records has only become possible
in recent decades, as the archives
have opened personnel files, and
the families of veterans have turned
personal letters over to research
institutions. In the present issue, Pat
Brennan of the University of Calgary
presents another of his path-breaking
studies on leadership in the Canadian
Corps, in this case senior officers
who had to leave the Western Front
because of the cumulative strain of
months and years in command. Eric
Brown and Tim Cook have distilled
a large collection of letters from two
brothers, both of whom entered
the Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air
Force during the last part of the war.
The family donated this valuable
collection to the Canadian War
Museum and Eric and Tim’s article
is part of continuing efforts to make
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the museum’s holdings more widely
known and accessible.
During the mid-1980s, Bruce
Ellis, who was then curator of the
The Army Museum in Halifax,
and I collaborated on a history
of Connaught Battery, one of the
least well known historic harbour
fortiﬁcations in that city. The piece
appeared in the Canadian Defence
Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 4 (spring 1986),
pp. 29-33. I realized with a jolt a few
months ago that that was nearly a
quarter century ago, and offered the
piece for possible reprint to Mike
Bechthold. Mike took up the offer,
but for a particular reason, I suspect.
The inspiration for the original
piece was Bruce’s discovery of a
dozen photographs taken during the
construction of the battery during the
First World War. CDQ had space to
publish only three of these shots, and
Mike jumped at the opportunity to
present additional images from the
collection. In a future issue, Bruce and
I will recount how we learned of the
story of Connaught Battery, present
some additional photographs of the
site, and bring developments at the
site up to date.
Roger Sarty
May 2009

The editors of Canadian Military History wish to thank the following people and
organizations for their contributions to this issue:
Harold Averill, Maggie Arbour-Doucette, Geoff Keelan, Kellen Kurschinski, Vanessa
McMackin, John Parry, Kathryn Rose, Susan Ross, Matt Symes, Andrew Thomson,
Jane Whalen.
Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre; Canadian War Museum; Directorate of
History & Heritage, Department of National Defence; Essex and Kent Scottish
Regiment; Security and Defence Forum, Department of National Defence; University
of Toronto Archives; Library and Archives Canada; Wilfrid Laurier University.
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Dear Sir,
am in full agreement with Dr. Granatstein’s
argument that the Canadian military
has since 1940 started to gravitate from
its British military culture to that of the
United States (“From Mother Country to
Far Away Relative: The Canadian-British
Military Relationship from 1945,” Winter
2009). What I do not agree with are some
of his examples. Comparing the Second
World War uniforms and equipment that
Canada used to those of the United States
or even the Germans is a favourite pasttime of many interested in military matters.
For the uninitiated and those who have
no experience with the actual garments
and individual pieces, it is easy to draw
quick conclusions from comments made
by soldiers or from observing photographs.
By actually studying the individual pieces,
referencing to period design, manufacture
and distribution documents, and by looking
at the lineage of each piece, much like
entomologists do with insects, a much more
accurate appreciation of military equipment
can be made.
For instance, Dr. Granatstein mentions
that the steel helmet (it is actually called a
Mk II Helmet) that the British and Canadians
used in the Second World War offered
no cover for the back of the neck (true), it
weighed a ton (not true, it weighed 1 kg)
and that it was so awkward it was almost
impossible to run while wearing it (partially
true). Dr. Granatstein ﬁnally administers a
historian’s ”coup de grâce” by stating that
“No Canadian wept when the helmet was
scrapped in the late-1950s.” Actually the Mk
II saw service with the Canadian Army and
Royal Canadian Navy until 1970.
The Mk II was a modernized Mk I
helmet that was first introduced by the
British in 1916. The Mk I had a bowl-like
design in order to protect soldiers in
trenches from indirect, overhead ﬁre and
did not provide ballistic protection to
the side and back of the head. The Mk II
Helmet was introduced in 1936 and used a
redesigned liner and chinstrap. In defence
of the British, the army knew about the
deﬁciencies in the design and was working
on a newer model of helmet that provided
better all-around ballistic protection to the
head. In 1943 the new Mk III Helmet was
issued to the British and Canadian assault
formations for the Normandy invasion.
Unfortunately the Mk III Helmet was never
adopted by the Canadian Army and the
Mk II was the standard helmet until 1960
when its replacement was began with the
US M1 which had been deemed the “NATO
Standard.”
If we briefly look at some of the
characteristics of the helmets mentioned
in Dr. Granatstein’s article, we see that the
Mk II weighed approximately 1 kg, the M1
weighed approximately 1.1 kg, so the US M1
was a heavier helmet. The British and the
Canadians wanted to adopt the M1 Helmet
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for standard issue, but because British radio
headsets could not be worn under the M1,
this plan was scrapped but only after Canada
had purchased 250,000 M1 Helmets in 1943,
some of which were eventually issued in
1960. The M1 Helmet was introduced in 1941
replacing the M1917A1 Helmet that was a US
modiﬁcation of the British Mk I.
Every problem that Dr. Granatstein
documents for the Mk II Helmet was also
reported by the US Army about the M1.
It was too heavy, difﬁcult to wear when
running, too noisy in conﬁned areas and
yes, there was even not enough ballistic
protection for the neck and side of the head.
Actually the best helmet design was the one
that the Germans developed during the
Great War, the M1916, and improved upon
during the Second World War starting with
the M1935. The German “Stahlhelm” had the
best overall ballistic protection for the head
and weighed 1.2 kg; in fact it was such a good
design that when the US military started
replacing their stocks of M1 Helmets in the
late 1970s, the new helmet design ended up
being similar to that of the German wartime
helmets. The new helmet was the PASGT
(Personal Armor System Ground Troops), it
was manufactured of Kevlar instead of steel,
it weighted just over 1.2 kg (a little heavier
than the M1), it had a similar ballistic shape
as the older German helmets and it had a
revised chin-strap. The PASGT was used by
the Canadian Forces during the 1990s until
the French-designed CG634 was adopted in
the late 1990s. The CG634 is now the current
CF Helmet, it is manufactured of Kevlar, like
all modern helmets, the shape is similar to
the PASGT and the older German helmets,
it also has a three-point chin-strap. It weighs

1.4 kg and is quite a bit heavier than the Mk
II which Dr. Granatstein stated was not very
good because of the weight.
Dr. Granatstein stated that “American
equipment too was increasingly coveted.
Sometimes this was because US equipment
was both more comfortable to wear, better
designed for protection and simply more
effective than the Second World War pattern
British material used by the Canadian
forces.” This like the above helmet statement
is very general and it is easy to come to these
conclusions when comparing Canadian/
British to American without knowing the
speciﬁc details.
When developing ﬁeld uniforms, both
the British and the Americans employed
a system that involved wearing multiple
layers of clothing. Uniforms were designed
for certain climatic regions and if we look at
British battledress (BD), it was an all-wool
garment consisting of a short tunic and long
trousers that were joined by buttons at the
waist (admittedly the button system never
worked right). This uniform was designed
to be worn year-round in the UK and
Northwest Europe and when developed in
1936-37 was a stylish, comfortable, modern,
and extremely durable field uniform. It
was, in fact, so modern and stylish that it
was copied by both the Americans (M1944
Wool Field Jacket) and the Germans (M44
Field Blouse) and was the staple uniform
design by many armies until the early 1960s.
British BD was designed at a time when
US and German soldiers were wearing
unforms designed during the Great War.
The Americans susequently dedicated vast
amounts of money and resources to clothing
designs that employed more cotton and less
wool such as the M1943 Field Jacket, but
even on the grand scale that US material
was manufactured and issued, the US Army
still could not fully re-equip before the end
of the Second World War and many of the
1940s woollen uniforms slogged it out with
the Americans and their Allies through the
Korean War and into the early 1960s.
Sure, these new designs by the
Americans were nice, but both Britain and
Canada were also producing newer ﬁeld
uniforms. By 1943 the British had a new
series of uniforms and equipment designed
for the war in the East against the Japanese.
The winter and bush clothing developed
by Canada in the late 1940s and early 1950s
evolved into the very modern combat and
winter clothing employed by the Canadian
military in the 1960s and the ﬁeld uniforms
worn today.
Just to show how problematic it is to
develop and issue new combat uniforms
on time and to the people who need them,
back when the Canadian military deployed
to Afghanistan in 2002 there were several
reports that the Canadians were perhaps
improperly issued with Canadian Disruptive
Pattern Temperate Region (CADPAT TR)
uniforms instead of desert or CADPAT Arid
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Region (CADPAT AR) clothing. In the 1990s
Canada had been trialling desert versions of
its current uniform but by 2001 had scrapped
the remaining stores of this uniform in
favour of the soon-to-be-produced CADPAT
AR uniform. CADPAT TR was just coming
into universal use by the CF in 2002 and the
issue of the arid version had to be sped up
in order to meet operational demands.
The same holds true with the staple
British web equipment of the Second World
War, the 1937 Pattern. Again, designed just
prior to the war as a replacement for the 1908
Pattern web, this set still employed highly
durable tightly woven cotton web as its
construction material. The new design was
an attempt to address problems encountered
with the 1908 Pattern and to accommodate
newer infantry weapons being introduced
at the time, namely the 30-round magazine
of the Bren light machine gun. A pair of
generously cut basic pouches were issued
to each soldier so that he could carry Bren
magazines and the concept of 1937 Pattern
Web was that required web pieces could
easily be added or removed from the
common waistbelt and braces.
The Americans also used cotton web for
their ﬁeld equipment although they took a
different approach and issued a specialized
belt according to the weapon used by the
soldier. From this individual web item,
pieces could easily be added or removed.
So, within a British infantry section, each
person has the same waistbelt with the same
basic pouches to carry ammunition and
magazines. An American infantry squad
employed three separate belts, the M1936
pistol belt for the squad leader, the M1923
dismounted cartridge belt for each riﬂeman
and the M1937 BAR belt for the Browning
Automatic Riﬂe Gunner. This lavish use of
resources may have worked for the US, but
in the UK one belt had to work for all.
US ﬁeld equipment did score full marks
for the design of the water bottle (M1942
canteen in US parlance), messtins (M1942
meat can) and perhaps eating utensils, but
even the US was not immune from copying
a good design when they started replacing
their M1910 entrenching shovel with the
M1943 folding entrenching shovel which
was a near perfect copy of the German
“Klappspaten” folding entrenching spade.
By 1943, the British had developed a
combination KFS (Knife, Fork and Spoon)
set for the war in the jungle and Canada
had followed suit manufacturing this
improved item although too late for issue
during the Second World War. By 1952
Canada had developed a very successful
KFS combination that is still in use today.
Soldiers are humans and coveting other
equipment still happens even within the
well-equipped CF of today. Using the “envy
factor” to dismiss or grade equipment can
be a dangerous approach to take without
knowing the background facts about each
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item. During the Second World War, US
soldiers coveted British BD tunics and
British troops coveted US M1941 ﬁeld jackets
because each thought the other’s garment
was better looking.
I will not dispute that much old clothing
and equipment designs were retained and
issued by the Canadian military long after
their usefulness and this is a common trait
with just about any large military force. The
post-1945 Canadian Army was a victim of its
wartime success. The small peace-time army
had more stuff then it could ever use and it
was easy to store it for issue when required.
With warehouses brimming with surplus
material, it was inevitable that this old, and
at times obsolete, kit would continue to be
issued into the early 1970s. British army
experience in the early 1980s really brought
to light the problem of saving old uniforms
and equipment. During the Falkland Islands
War in 1982, the British Army found that all
of the 1940s and 1950s vintage winter clothing
was not up to the demands and rigors of
1980s ground warfare. These revelations
lead to a clearing of all “war stocks” of old
uniforms and equipment throughout the UK
that lasted into the early 1990s. Thankfully
by the time the 1980s had rolled around
Canada’s stockpile of Second War clothing
and equipment had for the most part been
used up or sold off. Remember as well that
the US military had the same problem and
that even by the early 1970s many reserve
units were still being issued 1940s vintage
clothing and equipment.
When it comes to “broad-brush”
statements, two really caught my attention
relating to Canadian UN operations. The
ﬁrst concerned how peacekeeping had crept
into not only the nation’s psyche but also the
government’s: “The attitude also affected
the soldiers who came to think that they
were not meant to ﬁght.” I hope that this
statement is not implying that the Canadian
army as a whole started to consider itself
as a blue beret peacekeeping force, for this
is far from the truth. Good soldiers make
good peacekeepers, but those only trained
in peacekeeping do not make good soldiers.
Canadian soldiers trained for combat ﬁrst
which made them good peacekeepers as
well.
The other statement concerned the
Canadian battalions being referred to by the
British as “Can’t Bats” in reference to how
the Canadian Forces conducted operations
in The Former Yugoslavia under the UN
banner from 1991 until 1995. Canadian
UN operations in The Former Yugoslavia
never profited from the media attention
that we now see in coverage of Canadian
operations in Afghanistan. For the most
part the Canadian media stayed away from
the Balkans. Distasteful events unfolding
in Somalia in the early 1990s also tended to
deﬂect media and public interest from the
Balkans and today it is easy to cast a negative

shadow over the whole mission. This does a
disservice not only to those members of the
CF who served with the UN in The Former
Yugoslavia but also to the 11 Canadians who
were killed there under the UN ﬂag.
To set the record straight, the Canadian
battalions or Canbats in The Former
Yugoslavia were some of the best equipped
and trained UN soldiers in the region.
Initially the Canbats had been supplied
directly from 4 Canadian Mechanized
Brigade Group in Germany and were well
equipped not only with diverse small
arms and heavy weapons but also with an
extensive array of armour from Cougar
AVGPs to M113A2 Armoured Personnel
Carriers and their assorted variants including
anti-tank TOW Under Armour to Leopardbased Armoured Engineer Vehicles. In The
Former Yugoslavia the Canadians enjoyed
a celebrity status from being able to ﬁeld so
much heavy equipment and when required
assisted other less fortunate UN contingents
with parts, a status usually enjoyed by
the Americans. The Canadians were well
trained, motivated, highly professional and
could count on experience from other UN
missions, primarily Cyprus. The Canadians,
along with the British, firmly handled
relations with the Warring Factions and
much to the chagrin of the local warlords
had the tightest control of their sectors.
The British and the Canadians were used
to working together, knew their Rules of
Engagement (ROEs) and could match the
Warring Factions man for man in toughness
and bravado bringing relative stability to the
areas in which they operated.
In Canada each brigade and in fact
each regiment has its own personality and
unfortunately at times the personality of
one regiment or battalion could lack the
perceived professionalism and intensity of
operations as a regiment or battalion that
served before it. The change of operating
ethos was very apparent between two
such Canadian battalions in The Former
Yugoslavia with the replacement unit
appearing less operationally focused than
its predecessor. The British picked up on
this difference and soon, in true British
fashion, coined a name that rhymed with
the battalion’s name. It was not “Can’t Bat”
but it was similar. The name stuck only to
that speciﬁc battalion and did not, to my
knowledge, ever apply as a general term for
Canadian units in The Former Yugoslavia.
To quote Dr. Granatstein, “That is a fact.”
I agree with Dr. Granatstein’s thesis that
the Canadian military is gravitating more
towards our neighbour to the south, but I
disagree with the sweeping, simplistic and
inaccurate evidence that he uses to prove his
argument.
Ed Storey,
Nepean, ON
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